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OWNBEY v. MORGAN-A JUDICIAL MILEPOST ON THE.
ROAD TO ABSOLUTISM*
By FORREST REVERE BLAck*
In Ownbey v. Morgan,1 Ownbey, a resident of Colorado,
was sued in a Delaware court for an alleged debt, and shares of'
stock in a Delaware corporation owned by him were attached.
The Delaware statute as construed by the Delaware courts did
not permit a non-resident to make a general appearance and be.
heard in such a case unless he gave security to the value of the
property attached for the payment of any judgment that might
be rendered against him. Thus, bail was required on the theory'
that the statute provided that a general appearance by the defendant ipso facto released the attachment. Because of a priorreceivership instituted by the Morgan interests, the stock of
Ownbey had no market value, which made it worthless as.
security for a loan. Ownbey had no other property. He endeavored to make a general appearance, but the Delaware court
denied him the right 'to defend the suit and gave judgment
against him by default. Ownbey carried his case to the
Supreme Court of the United States asserting that the Delaware
statute as construed by the Delaware courts denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld
the Delaware statute and the proceedings thereunder, Chief'
Justice White and Mr. Justice Clarke dissenting.
In order to understand the issues in this unusual case, it is
imperative that we start with a detailed analysis of the factual
* This is one of a series of essays to be published under the general
caption "Judicial Mileposts on the Road to Absolutism." Other chap-.
ters have appeared as follows: Carroll v. United States (1929), 29 Col.
L. Rev. 1069; Missouri v. Holland (1931), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 911; The Selec-.
tive Draft Oases (1931), 2 B. U. L. R. 37; Burdeau v. McDowe7l (1932),
12 B. U. L. R. 32; Debs v. United States (1932), 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 160;
Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch-The Penumbra Doctrine in Prohibition
Enforcement (1933), 27 Ill. L. Rev. 511.
** Chief Attorney, Agricultural Adjustment Administration; Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, on leave 1934-35; Author of,
"Ill Starred Prohibition Cases" with a Foreword by Clarence Darrow
(1931); A. B., Wisconsin; M. A., Columbia; LL. B., Ohio State University; Ph. D., Robert Brookings Graduate School of Government; Member of Governor Laffoon's Liquor Control Committee.
1256 U. S. 94, 65 L. Ed. 837 (1921).
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background. The Delaware statute under which these proceedings were instituted, was based on the custom of London and
was originally enacted in 1770 and amended several times there.after. The sections pertinent to the controversy are as follows :2
4142, Sec. 25: "A writ of foreign attachment may be issued against
any person not an inhabitant of this state . . . upon affidavit made
by the plaintiff, or some other credible person, and filed with the
Prothonotary, that the defendant resides out of the state, and is justly
indebted to the said plaintiff in a sum exceeding fifty dollars."
4123, Sec. 6: "If the defendant in the attachment, or any sufficient
person for him, will, at any time before judgment, appear and give
-security to the satisfaction of the plaintiff in such cause, or to the
satisfaction of the court and to all actions brought against such defendant, to the value of the property, rights, credits and monies attached, and the costs, then the garnishee and all property attached shall
be discharged."
4137, Sec. 20: "Judgment shall be given for the plaintiff in the attachment the second term after issuing the writ, unless the defendant
shall enter special bail as aforesaid; whereupon, the court shall make
an order that the sheriff shall sell the property attached, on due notice,
.and pay the proceeds (deducting legal costs and charges) to the auditors for distribution.

Proceeding under this statute, the plaintiffs filed an affiZavit made by one Joyce, a credible person, and set forth that
the defendant, Ownbey, resided out of the state and was justly
indebted to the plaintiffs in a sum exceeding $50. Thereupon,
a writ of foreign attachment was issued to the Sheriff of New
Castle County, which plaintiffs caused to be endorsed with a
memorandum to the effect that special bail was required in the
sum of $200,000, and under which the sheriff attached 33,324
-shares of stock (phr value $5 each) held and owned by the defendant in the Wooten Land and Fuel Company, a Delaware
,corporatioii, and made a proper return. Later the defendant,
by attorneys, without giving security, went through the form
2The statutes are found in Delaware Rev. Code 1915. It should be
noted that the stock of the defendant in the Delaware statute was attached under Section 2009 of the Revised Code, which provides, "The
shares of any person in an incorporated company, with all the rights
thereunto belonging may be attached for debt," etc. The corporation
was not attached, nor was it summoned as garnishee. Hence See. 4120
was not used, which provides that "All corporations doing business
in this state are subject to the operations of the attachment laws," etc.
Hence, the point raised, that this corporation was not doing business in
the state, was not applicable. Revised Code, Section 1986, provides that
"for all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment . . . the
situs of thd ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing
"nnder the laws of this state . . . shall be regarded as in this state."
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of entering a general appearance, and filed pleas of nonassumpsit, the statute of limitations, and payment. The plaintiff's attorneys moved to strike out the appearance and pleas on
the ground that special bail, or security as required by the
statute had not been given. The defendant answered that the
stock attached in this case constituted substantially all of his
property; that the company was in the hands of a receiver, and
because of this the market value of the shares attached was,
temporarily destroyed, so that they were unavailable for use in
obtaining the required bail, or security to procure the dischargeof the shares from attachment, and that it was impossible for
the defendant to secure bail or security in the sum of $200,000
or any adequate sum, for the release of the shares so attached;
that defendant had a good defense in that the indebtedness sued
upon had been paid; that by the true construction of the Delaware statutes the entry of bail or security for the discharge of
the property attached was not a necessary prerequisite to the
entry of defendant's appearance, and such appearance might bemade without disturbing the seizure of property under the writ,
or its security for any judgment finally entered; and that if the.
statutes could not be so construed as to permit appearance and
defense in a case begun by foreign attachment without the entryof bail, or security for the discharge of the property seized, they
were unconstitutional in that (a) they abridged the privileges,
and immunities of citizens of the United States, (b) that they
denied, to the defendant the equal protection of the law; and
(e)that they deprived the defendant of property without dueprocess of law. Upon motion of the plaintiffs this response and
the attempted appearance and pleas of the defendant werestruck out by the Supreme Court of Delaware.
In order that the reader may have a clear picture of the
issue as it reaches the Supreme Court of the United States, we,
shall quote two excerpts from the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Delaware. The Court in bane, speaking through Chief
3
Justice Pennewill, said,
"The court have been very strongly impressed, during the progress
of the case, with the thought that the situation of the defendant wasnot only a hard one, but also very exceptional. Having no property
whatever except the corporate stock attached, the attachment together
with the receivership secured in Colorado made it impossible for the
'36 Boyce (Del.) 379, 100 At. Rep. 411, 434 (1917).
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defendant to enter the bail demanded in the action. By the receiver-ship proceeding the stock was stripped of any immediate market value
and became practically worthless as a security or pledge for advancement or loan. . . Because of the peculiar circumstances of the case
and the inability of the defendant to app.ear by giving the bail re-quired, his motion to open the judgihent in order that he might have
an opportunity to make a defense, and the case be tried on the merits
:appealed strongly to the sympathy and discretion of the court. But
after a most careful consideration of all the facts we are forced to the
4conclusion that no sufficient reason has been shown to justify the
,opening of said judgment. We are clearly of the opinion that the legislature ought to provide for the opening, of a judgment In foreign attachment against an individual in the same manner as is provided
against corporations, but we are equally clear that the court cannot
relieve the defendant from the hardship imposed by the statute. To
,do so would be judicial legislation."

Later the Supreme Court of Delaware 4 affirmed the judgment in bane in these words (with no further reasons):
"However as the judges comprising the Supreme Court at the time
iofthe argument were also members of the court in banc at the time
that court heard and determined the same questions raised by the
assignments of error, also in view of the fact that the same question
cannot arise in the future for the reason that by recent legislation
defendants, in foreign attachment cases, are permitted to appear without first giving bail, we will not state reasons for our decision in this
court, our conclusions being the same as they were at the time the
case was argued and determined by the court in banc."

We shall limit our discussion of this case to the due process
contention. The first point in our critique has to do with the
question, whether the Supreme Court of Delaware miseonstrued
the statute.5 The Delaware court in bane quoted above refers
"to the hardship imposed by the statute." Was it imperative
that the Delaware tourt, without resorting to "judicial legislation," must construe the statute so as to impose a hardship?
Several considerations have a bearing on this problem. (1) It
is a sound principle that a court, when confronted with a statute,
the language of which admits of two constructions, should adopt
the more reasonable of the two, and this is especially so when
the alternative construction will lead to oppression and a denial
' 30 Del. (Boyce) 297, 323, 105 Atl. Rep. 849 (1918).
5
We lead off with this query in order to give the reader a chronological picture of the trials and tribulations of the defendant, Ownbey.
In doing so, we are cognizant of the doctrine that the Supreme Court
of the United States will not substitute its interpretation for the interpretation placed on the state statute by the state court, but will when
properly raised, pass on the constitutionality of the state court's interpretation bf the statute. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
TUnited States, v. 2, p. 1300.)
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,of justice.0 (2) A statute on attachment should be strictly construed. The Supreme Court of Delaware, in construing a
foreign attachment statute in the case of Smitkb v. Armoirr1 said,
"It must be borne in mind that this is not a common law remedy.
It is purely a creature of the statute, and has been quite uniformly viewed as a violent proceeding by which the property
of the defendant is taken and seized upon before the claim is
judicially determined by a competent court of law, and has
therefore been uniformly strictly construed. (3) The construction placed upon the Delaware statute by the Supreme Court
-of Delaware in the case at bar renders it an anomoly among
those of other American states and would compel an attitude of
unenviable isolation in regard to the protection of rights so
basic and so universally recognized, as the rights of appearance
and defence. The attachment laws of Delaware, although based
on the Custom of London, were originally taken from the legislation of Pennsylvania. The Delaware Court of Errors and
Appeals, the highest court in the state, in the case of Reybold v.
Parkers admits this, and yet the Pennsylvania statute has not
been construed in such a manner that appearance releases the
attachment and that additional bail is necessary.0
(4) The construction contended for by the defendant is
not only in accord with the law in other jurisdictions, but also
it accomplishes the two purposes of an attachment law (a) to
operate as notice to the defendant to appear and defend and
(b) to subject the property seized to the debt of the plaintiff,
when ascertained.'"
Section 4123 provides "that if the defendant in the attachment, or any sufficient person for him, will
at any time before judgment appear and give security to the
satisfaction of the court . . . to the value of the property,
rights, credits and monies attached, and the costs, then the
garnishees and all property attached shall be discharged."
It
would seem that the reasonable interpretation of this section,
bearing in mind especially the words "at any time before judgOEndlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, p. 343.
71 Penn. (Del.) 361, 40 Atl. 720, 721 (1898).
86 Houston (Del.) 544, 554 (1882).
'Sergeant on Foreign Attachments, pp. 24-25. So in Illinois, under
a somewhat similar statute the Pennsylvania construction is used in
the case of Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman 211 (1844) (in which Abraham
Lincoln was an attorney).
10 Shinn on Attachment and Garnishment, Sees. 5, 191, 221, 442, 449.
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ment", clearly gives a privilege to the defendant, by which he
may substitute personal security for that of the detention of his
goods, to abide the issue of the suit."' Section 4137 provides.
that "judgment shall be given to the plaintiff in attachment the
second term, after issuing the writ, unless the defendant shall
enter special bail as aforesaid". This section standing alone
may give some color to the plaintiff's contention, but by reading
it with reference to the whole scope of the statute and bearing
in mind that nowhere in the statute is the right to appear, irrespective of giving security denied,' 2 it would seem that the
reasonable construction of Sec. 4137 contemplates a situation
likely to occur in foreign attachment cases, in which the defendant has entered no appearance at the term to which the
writ is returned, or thereafter, and it therefore becomes necessary to perfect the proceeding quasi in rem (which the attachment up to that point is) by a judgment of condemnation of the
property seized.
(5) The defendant's construction of the Delaware statute in
relation to the "special bail" provision is not only reasonable,
but is also in accord with the general theory and usage of bonds
in attachment cases. In general, there are two kinds of bonds
to procure the release of property from the possession of the
attaching officer. One kind contains the principal condition,
that if judgment in the attachment suit be rendered against
the defendant, the property shall be forthcoming to satisfy the
execution on such judgment; otherwise, that the sureties will
be bound to the extent, in some instances, of the value of the
property, and in other instances, to the amount of the indebtedness. These bonds are variously called "bail bonds", "forth-coming bonds", and "delivery bonds". Such bonds release the
property only from the custody of the officer and do not release
it from the lien of the attachment. A second class of bonds
contains the principal condition that the defendant in the attachnent suit will 'perform whatever judgment may be entered
against him" in such attachment suit, and in default thereof,
n Ibid., Sees. 302, 583, 584.
2 The Supreme Court of Delaware in, bane, speaking through
Pennewill, J., settles this point with this unconvincing pronunciamento: "While there is no express inhibition in the statute against it,
the implication is as strong and conclusive as an express inhibition
would be." Morgan v. Ownbey, 100 Atl. 411, 420 (1917).
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and in the event that judgment is entered against such defendant, that the sureties will pay the amount thereof. A bond
of this class not only releases the officer from further liability
as to the care and custody of the property, but also releases the
property itself from the lien of such attachment, working an
entire dissolution of the attachment so far as the property is
concerned and thereafter the bond itself is held as the substitute
13
for the res.
Now it is true that the Delaware procedure contemplated a bond of the second class because appearance was conditioned upon the filing of a bond and the appearance automatically released the attachment and therefore the bond itself
was held necessarily as a substitute for the res. But the Delaware procedure is inconsistent with the general theory underlying the filing of bonds in attachment cases. That theory is
that the bond provision constitutes a privilege 14 of the defendant in an attachment case. The plaintiff cannot complain
if the defendant fails to exercise the privilege nor can the plaintiff ordinarily take any steps to prohibit the exercise of the
privilege on the part of the defendant.
With this much as a background, let us consider the exceptional advantages afforded to the plaintiff under this ancient
Delaware statute as construed by the highest Delaware court.
(1) Prior to the selection of the Delaware forum by the
plaintiff, a suit was instituted in Colorado by the plaintiff
against this defendant, which threw his property into receivership and temporarily destroyed its market value. (2) Then
the plaintiff comes into the Delaware court and files an affidavit
alleging the non-residence of the defendant and the indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff in a sum exceeding $50,
as the statute requires. (3) Then the plaintiff, as dominus
litus, endorses on this affidavit the words "Bail, $200,000."
(4) and the court having given its approval to this sum,
the final curtain falls in this Delaware due process travesty
just as the plaintiff has been awarded a default judgment.
The Delaware statute does not require the plaintiff in his
affidavit to state (a) the nature of the cause of action, other
11 Shinn on Attachment and Garnishment, v. 1, p. 542.
2Shinn on Attachment, v. 1, p. 583; Watson v. Kennedy, 8 La.
Ann. 380 (1835).
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than that the defendant is indebted to him in excess of $50;
(b) no bill of particulars need be stated; and (c) the real amount
of the indebtedness need not be sworn to. Although the Delaware courts insist that their statute is based on the Custom of
London, at least the Custom of London required the plaintiff
to sweak to the real amount of his indebtedness. 15 (d) From
the time the suit is instituted until after judgment is entered
by default against the defendant, there is no statement of record
in the cause required by either statute or rule of court, other
than the affidavit, from which the defendant can derive any information as to the nature of the plaintiff's claim or its amount,
or determine whether he will contest the same, if permitted, or
determine whether the amount of bail marked on the writ is
just.1
(e) The Delaware procedure does provide that after
such default judgment, a declaration may be filed as preliminary
to the holding of the inquisition at bar, to ascertain the exact
amount of the judgment.
It should be obvious that this affidavit is wholly insufficient
and inadequate as a compliance with the requirement of due
process of law, either (a) as notice to the defendant of the
nature and amount of the plaintiff's claim, or (b) as any proper
basis or justification for determining the amount of bail. If a
$50 affidavit is sufficient to support a $200,000 bail, why not a
$1 affidavit or none at all.
The plaintiff, having temporarily destroyed the market
value of the defendant's property by the receivership proceeding, sets the bail at a figure ($200,000) which the defendant
cannot meet, and the way is thus open for a default judgment.
The attorneys for the defendant in error present two arguments
to justify this bail requirement. 7 (1) The argument is made
that the bail of $200,000 was not excessive because the judgment
ascertained by the inquisition was $200,168.75. But the answer
is obvious; this was a default judgment. It is a mere conjecture
as to the amount of and the nature of the judgment if the defendant had had the opportunity for a fair hearing and trial
on the merits. The defendant sought to plead payment, the
2 See the brief of the Plaintiff in Error in the Supreme Court of
the U. S. by Louis 3. Marshall, Ward, Gray and Neary, p. 63.
'61Ibid., p. 76-77.
'Brief of Defendant in Error in the Supreme Court of the U. S.
by Harlan F. Stone and Williard Saulsbury, p. 15.
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statute of limitations, and non assumpsit. (2) The further contention is made that Ownbey could have appeared specially and
asked that the amount of the bail be reduced, if he thought it
was unreasonable. The defendant in error cites Vienne v. McCartky'8 for this proposition, but an analysis of the case discloses its inapplicability. That case held that where there was a
foreign attachment, the court would inquire into the cause of
action and dissolve it if sufficient cause be not shown. The suit
had been brought against McCarthy,; surviving partner of James
Oummins on a bill of exchange drawn by James Cummins, contracted before the partnership had been formed. The court held
that something more must be shown before McCarthy can be held
and hence since no sufficient cause of action appears against the
defendant the attachment is dissolved. In the principal case there
is nothing in the procedure of Delaware that would have enabled the court informally to have determined whether or not
Ownbey was indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of $200,000
or in any amount. The defenses, if permitted, were non assumpsit, the statute of limitations, .and payment. An informal
investigation would have disclosed merely that there was an issue; that issue could only have been determined by a trial and
the defendant was entitled to a jury trial of the issues. Such an
informal investigation could not be a valid substitute for an
orderly trial.19
The real clash between the parties grows out of this bail
requirement. Let us state their respective positions. The Morgan attorneys argue that foreign attachment is a process by
which appearance of the non-resident defendant is enforced;
then when he is brought in by attachment, that process has
served its purpose; then in order to defend, he must put up
bail. Prior to the appearance which is conditioned by bail, the
suit is characterized as an ex parte proceeding in rem. After
the bail has been met, then the -action becomes in personam and
the appearance automatically releases the attachment.2 0 The
2 1 Dallas 154 (1801); see Ibid., n. 16, at p. 17.
' See Plaintiff in Errors Brief in Supreme Court of U. S., pp. 3-7.
" The Morgan attorneys admit after citing many Delaware cases
that "the immediate point may not have been presented to the Delaware courts in the foregoing cases, yet the expressions by the court
pertaining thereto are NOT OBITER and are authoritative expositions
of the law." Page Mr. Oliphant: This is a queer doctrine of stare
decisis. See p. 35 of Defendant in Errors Brief in U. S. Supreme Court.
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Delaware courts having construed the statute in such a manner
as to cause appearance to release the attachment, the Morgan
attorneys insist that to allow Ownbey to appear without meeting the bail requirement, would cause the plaintiff to lose the
benefit of his discovery and industry.' The stock attached was
the only assets that Ownbey had. The plaintiff insists that if
Ownbey were allowed to appear -without giving bail, the plaintiff
would have what was equivalent to personal service on Ownbey,
and the plaintiff would be then faced with the problem of pursuing him over the United States in a fruitless effort to find some
property belonging to him out of which judgment could be collected. 21
On the contrary, Ownbey contends that after the plaintiff
has started a suit by attaching the property of a non-resident
defendant, the plaintiff must, first of all permit said defendant
to make a free choice of one of three alternatives: (a) either
ignore the attachment proceedings and lose the property to the
extent of the judgment by default, or (b) permit the defendant
to put up bail in lieu of the property attached, or (c) permit the
defendant to appear on the merits, leaving the lien upon the
property attached undisturbed. Such alternatives are not only
consistent with the theory of foreign attachment statutes, but
also are in fact open to the non-resident defendant under the
foreign attachment laws of every other state of the Union. In
the case at bar, Ownbey insists on the exercise of the third alternative and if the Delaware statute is so construed as to debar
him from the exercise of this elementary right, he insists that
the statute as construed is violative of due process of law.
For the purpose of raising the due process question, we
submit the following analysis: (1) A suit instituted by attachment is quasi in rem; (2) When the Delaware court construes
the statute so that a general appearance necessarily releases the
attachment, the legal effect of such a construction is to remove
the only factor that makes the action quasi in rem and thereafter the statute governs an in personam action. (3) The presentation of bail under the statute is an absolute condition precedent to and an integral part of general appearance. Although
See Oliphant: "A Return to Stare Decisis." American Bar Associati6n Journal, 1928, pp. 71, 159.
21Defendant in Errors Brief in U. S. Supreme Court, pp. 16-19.
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from a strictly technical point of view, the condition precedent
is the first step in the appearance process, in practice and in
legal contemplation it is synchronous with and an inotegral part
'of general appearance. Section 4137 provides that "judgment
.shall be given for the plaintiff in the attachment, the second
term after issuing the writ, unless the defendant shall enter
special bail as aforesaid". Thus, the giving of security under
this statute constitutes a general appearance, 22 otherwise, the
plaintiff would have the advantage of both attachment and bail.
(4) It follows from the above, that the point of time from which
the action is transformed from a quasi in rem- to an in personam proceeding dates from the giving of bail. Therefore the
bail requirement must meet the in personam test of due process
-of law, to-wit: Under it there must be afforded a reasonable
notice and an opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing.
Any attempt to impose an impossible condition as a prerequisite to the right to a general appearance and a defense on the
merits is as invalid as it would be to attempt to provide for a
fictitious notice and hearing.
The non-resident defendant attempts to proceed on the
theory that the action instituted by attachment is quasi in rem.
He argues for the right to appear and defend on the merits,
leaving the lien upon the property attached to satisfy any claim
that may be found against him. We have shown that this contention is based on a reasonable construction of the statute.
What is the danger or hardship to the plaintiff that compels
the Delaware court to put a strained interpretation upon this
-statute by converting the action from an in rem to an in personain proceeding? And what does Delaware offer the delendant as an alternative? Of what avail is the service of a
sumnons or of a citation or of any other process, to one hailed
into court to answer a demand for judgment made against
him and who is eager and ready to make a meritorious defense,
-when under the Delaware statute, as construed, he is gagged
,at the very threshold by the imposition of an impossible con,dition that has been set by his opponent in the litigation? The
statute, in effect, makes conditional and, in this case, impossible
2 The Delaware Supreme Court in Bane declared, "In a foreign
attachment case there can be no appearance without entering special
bail; indeed, the entering of bail constitutes the defendant's appearance." J. Pennewill, in 100 At. 411, 421 (1917).
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the very safeguards that the due process clause guarantees m
an in personam action, namely, notice and hearing.
We now come to a critique of the decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Ten years after the decision in
the Ownbey case,28 the Supreme Court of the United States, in
a unanimous decision, stated the reason underlying the Ownbey
decision: "In Ownbey v. Morgan, we upheld rather harsh
legislation of the State of Delaware modeled on the Custom of
London and dating back to colonial days. Its validity, challenged because of alleged conflict with the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment was sustained because of the origin, and
antiquity of the provisions". In order to show the inadequacy
of this reason, several facts are introduced by way of background. (1) The Superior Court of Delaware admitted 24 that
although this statute had been on the books since 1770, a case
on all fours with the Ownbey case had never been presented to
a Delaware court, i. e., a case where the bail requirement was
an impossible condition for the defendant to meet. (2) It is a
fact uncontradicted in the record, that other states having
foreign attachment statutes based on the Custom of London
were not construed by their highest courts in such a manner
as to make appearance release the attachment. The Superior
Court of Delaware confronted with this phenomenon and admitting its truth counters with this comment:25 "This case
involves a construction. of a statute of our own state, and cases
from other jurisdictions cannot be of much assistance to the
court in any event". Professor Sunderland, commenting on
this point, says:20 "An investigation of the rule in other states
that once had a statute based on the Custom of London indicates
that in every one of them the rule long ago succumbed to the
progress of enlightened civilization and passed over the Styx
into the shadowy land of legal tradition, where the ghosts of
ancient laws wander restlessly forever". (3) We have already
shown that the Statute of London was not as harsh and.severe
as the Delaware construction of the Delaware2-7 statutes. (4)
While the case was pending in the Delaware courts the legis21Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 218, 223 (1930).
100 AtI. 411, 421 (1917).
-100 AtI. 411, 421 (1917).
0 Note in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 853-854.
"Note 15, supra.
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lature of the state amended the statute so "that another Ownbey
case cannot arise in the future. "28
(5) The conclusion from
the above considerations is that the Ownbey case is unique and
stands'in unenviable isolation, not only. in Delaware, but in all
the other states having a foreign attachment statute based on
the Custom of London.
It seems reasonable to assume that the unique and exceptional character of the Ownbey case should have conditioned and
controlled not only the Delaware courts but also the Supreme
Court of the United States in disposing of the following contentions: (1) The court said, 29 Ownbey's "appeal in effect was
to the summary and equitable jurisdiction of a court of law so
to control its own process and proceedings as not to produce
hardship. This is a recognized extraordinary jurisdiction of
common law courts, distinguishable from their ordinary or
formal jurisdiction. It has been much developed since the separation of the Americai colonies from England. But where the
proceedings have been regular, it is exercised as a matter of
grace or discretion, not as of right. A liberal exercise of this
summary and equitable jurisdiction in the interest of substantial
justice and in relaxation of the rigors of strict legal practice is
to be commended; but it cannot be said to be essential to due
process of law, in the constitutional sense."
(2) The uniqueness of the Ownbey case should completely
repudiate the idea that it is in accord with "settled usage" in
this country and therefore with due process and the further
fact that the Delaware proceedings are much more harsh 30 and
inequitable than the Custom of London should demonstrate that
there is no "settled usage" in England as a basis for the due
process doctrine. But admitting arguendo that there is a factual
background of "settled usage" both here and in England for
the Delaware practice it would seem that the Supreme Court of
the United States would have been on firmer ground if it had
repudiated the English usage test and had adopted the one
more in accord with the mores of a later time. Thus, in Murray
v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company,31 the acid test
of due process from a procedural standpoint was "the common
" See Ownbey v. Morgan, 105 Atl. 838, 849 (1918).
256 U. S. 94, 110 (1920).
'"Note 15, supra.
" 18 Howard (U. S. 1855) 272, at 280, 15 L. Ed. 372.
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and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the states at the time of the
adoption of this (Fifth) amendment". The later case of Hturtado
v. Caldfornia32 repudiates English usage as the test of due process of law. Justice Mathews said, "It would be to stamp upon
our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the Medes
and the Persians. This would be all the more singular and
surprising in this quick and active age, when we consider that
owing to the progressive development of legal ideas and institutions in England, the words of Magna Charta stood for very
different things at the time of the separation of the American
colonies from what they represented originally". It should be
noted that the Hurtado case did not overrule 33 the Murray case,
but simply stands for the proposition that other forms of proc6dure should also be upheld. It is believed that the "struck
jury ' 34 .case was the first one in which the court upheld a gubstantial departure from the norms of the common law. In a
later case 3 5 Justice Moody said that the Murray rule tended to
fasten on the courts the form of procedure of*the colonial period
"like a straight-jacket, only to be loosed by a constitutional
amendment. "
In the Ownbey case the court said,36 "However desirable
it is that the old forms of procedure be improved with the
progress of time, it cannot rightly be said that the Fourteenth
Amendment furnishes a universal and self-executing remedy.
Its function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform." Professor Sunderland, 37 commenting on this "cheerless view" of the Constitution, says, "This sounds like the exclusion from the purview of
the Constitution of practically all cases of outworn processes
and would probably justify the current use of trial by battle...
U. S. 516 (1884).
"See Mott-Due Process of Law, Chap. XIV, Due Process and
Settled Ijsage; also Hannis Taylor-Due Process of Law, pp. 12, 56, 62.
a4Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 (1899). It should be noted
that the "struck jury" case involved a new remedial process that was
criticised as too radical. It involved just the converse of the Ownbey
case, where an obsolete process was used that was out of harmony
with prevailing conceptions of justice. These represent the two classes
of cases arising under the procedural aspect of due process.
"Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
"256 U. S. 94, 112 (1920).
"Note in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 853-854.
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The -reasoning of the court seems to accord too high a degree of
respectability to the lingering relics of a ruder age."
Historical scholars in the last few decades have been delving
into th6 mass of statutes in our various states. It has been the
frequent complaint of these scholars and of revisors 3s that legislation is passed without any regard for the previous legislation
in the field. The well known fecundity of state legislatures has
resulted in multiplying the laws without eliminating those which
changing conditions have rendered obsolete. The very existence
,of this mass of obsolete statutes in our various states makes the
Ownbey doctrine vicious in fact, and this is especially so inasmuch as our courts have never adopted the doctrine of repeal
by desuetude. 3 9 The Ownbey doctrine in its worst form will
be found in those cases 40 (none too rare) where law enforcement
agencies will be roused to action by extraneous motives and
-obsolete laws will be utilized. As an illustration, witness the
prosecutions of Bimba, a labor organizer, and Kallgn, a Sacco
Vanzetti sympathizer, under a blasphemy statute of Alassachusetts, under which there had been no reported case for one
41
hundred years.
38At least five states have special commissions to investigate obsolete statutes. 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1302, 1305. Judicial councils may also
give some aid; also Legislative Reference Burea-ds and the attempt
of Attorney Generals' Offices to revise and codify statutes.
Although there may be some recognition of this doctrine in the
Roman Law (Just. Code Tit. 9, c. 52, See. 2) and although there are
a few early cases at common law in England where nonuser or a contrary custom perhaps could repeal a statute, the doctrine of desuetude
is not now followed in the United States. See Gray, "Nature and
Sources of the Law," 2nd ed. 329 (1921); see Jones, "Statute Law
Making as to Repeal by Lapse of Time," p. 155. In the Roman Law,
for the decay of custom and the loss of a right by failure to exercise
it when a flamen Dialis claimed and assumed a seat in the Senate, the
praetor on putting him out, said, "non exoletis vetustate annalium
exemplis, stare ius, sed recentissimae cuiusque consuetudinis usu
Tolebat; nec patrum nee avorum memoria Dialem quemquam id ius
usurpasse." Livy, Liber 27, Chap. 8, par. 9.
" See N. Y. Times, August 28, 1928, p. 8, col. 1; August 30, 1928,
p. 37, Col. 1; March 3, 1926, p. 25, Col. 6; see Chafee, "The Inquiring
Mind" 108 (1928).
4Prof. Morris in his "Studies in the History of American Law" has
pointed out historic survivals of obsolete practices to be found In
statutes now on the* books and not repealed, pp. 225-230; 122; also
Morris, "Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America," 27 Col. L.
Rev. 47, et seq. A few old statutes could not be enforced because they
apply only to conditions that have ceased to exist; see State v. Tidwel,
'5 Strob I (S. C.) 1850, where statute refers to a "guardian in socage;"
others have been repealed by implication or have been declared un,constitutional.
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(3) The Supreme Court of the United States next utilizes.
the presumption that the defendant knew the law in order to
show that this Delaware statute was in accord with due process.
The Court says, 42 "It cannot be deemed so arbitrary as to render
the procedure inconsistent with due process of law when applied
to a defendant, who, through exceptional circumstances, is unable to furnish the necessary security; certainly not where such
defendant-as is the case now presented, so far as the record
shows-has acquired the property right and absented himself
from the state after the practice was established, and hence
with notice that his property situate there would be subject to
disposition under foreign attachment by the very method that
afterwards was pursued, and that he would have no right to.
eilter appearance and make defense except upon giving security". Does this sound convincing when we bear in mind.that
this statute invoked was passed in early colonial times, and that
we have in 'the record of the case the admission of the Delaware
Court 43 that no case at all similar to the Ownbey case had ever
been. presented to the Delaware courts in the history of the
Commonwealth? Granting that desuetude is not a ground for
repealing a statute, this argument stretches the presumption of
knowing the law to the nth degree and our highest court in
utilizing it actually weakens its decision.
(4) We conclude with an analysis of other cases to show
that the Delaware proceedings do not afford the safeguards guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment.
We have already stressed the point that Delaware stood in unenviable isolation among her sister states when the Ownbey case
was decided. No other state had a similar procedural set up
and the Supreme Court of Delaware admitted that no case essentially similar to the Ownbey case had ever been decided in
D)elaware, 44 although the statute had been in existence since
1770. Because of this factual background it will be difficult
even to argue from other cases by way of analogy. However,
4256

U. S. 94, 111 (1920).

SSupra, n. 23.

"The explanation of this paradoxical situation is to be found in
the following considerations: (1) the statute was seldon used; (2)
where b'ail had been required, it was small in amount and did not constitute an impossible consideration; (3) and in some cases the defendant desired to get his attached property back and used bail forthat purpose.

OwNBEY v. MORGAN-A MILEPOST TO ABSOLUTISm
there are a few landmark cases that have been decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States dealing with due process,
of law from the procedural aspect that will be helpful in throw45
ing light on our specific problem. In Winsor v. McVeigh, .
the form of action was ejeetment for a tract of land situated in,
the city of Alexandria, Virginia. The plaintiff proved title in
himself, unless his life estate in the land had been divested bkr
a sale under a decree of condemnation rendered in March, 1864,
by the District Court of the United States. The defendant relied upon the deed to his grantor executed by the marshal under,
such condemnation sale. The proceedings mentioned were instituted under the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and
confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes". The
premises in controversy were seized by the marshals; libel against
the property was filed in the name of the United States, and
the district judge ordered process of monition and notice to
issue and designated a day and place for the trial. The owner,
in response to the monition and notice, appeared by counsel and
filed a claim to the property and an answer to the libel. The
District Attorney moved that the claim and answer and appearance of the respondent be stricken from the files, on the ground
that it appeared from his answer that he was at the time of the
filing of same "a resident within the city of Richmond, within
the Confederate lines and a rebel". The motion was granted,
and the court immediately entered its sentence and decree, condemning the property as forfeited to the United States. The
Supreme Court held that the sentence of confiscation was as
inoperative upon his rights as though no monition or notice had
ever been issued. The legal effect of striking out his appearance was to recall the monition and notice as to him. The court
further declared that "the jurisdiction acquired by seizure of
property, in a proceeding in rem for its condemnation for alleged forfeiture, is not to pass upon the forfeiture absolutely,
but to pass upon that question after opportunity has been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear, and be
heard. Such a forfeiture pronounced against a person without
hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not
4693

U. S. 274 (1876).
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-a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to
-respect in any other tribunal".
It should be borne in mind that this was an action in rem
and that Justice Field, speaking for the court, said, 46 "A denial
to a party of the benefit of a notice would be, in effect, to deny
that he i§ entitled to notice at all, and the sham and deceptive
proceeding had better be omitted altogether. It would be like
.saying to a party, 'appear and you shall be heard'; and when
he has appeared, saying 'Your appearance shall not be recognized and you shall not be heard'. . . It is difficult to speak
-of a decree thus rendered with moderation; it was in fact a
mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence."
If the procedural requirements in Windsor v. McVeigh constituted a "mere mockery" and a "solemn fraud" in an action
that was admittedly in rem, what shall be said of the Delaware
procedural contrivance in the Ownbey case?
In McVeigh v. United States, 47 the same Congressional
,statute was involved as in the Windsor case and the court again
strucli out the appearance and answer of the defendant upon
request of the government. Justice Swayne, speaking for the
court, said, "In our judgment, the District court committed a
serious error in ordering the claim and answer of the respondent
to be stricken from the files. The order in effect denies the
respondent a hearing. It was alleged that the defendant was
in the position of an alien enemy, and hence could have no locus
standi in that forum. If assailed there, he could defend there.
The liability and the right are inseparable. A different result
would be a blot upon our jurisprudence and civilization." The
-court further said, "After the decree, pro confesso, McVeigh
,occupied the same relation to the record as a defendant against
-whom a judgment by default has been taken. The case is wholly
unlike a proceeding purely in rem, where no claimant is named
and none appears until after the final decree or judgment is
rendered, and the case has terminated. We entertain no doubt
that the plaintiff in error, McVeigh, had the right to sue out the
writ and that the record is properly before us." The court further said, "whatever may be the extent of the disability of an
alien enemy to sue in the courts of the hostile country, it is
6 93 U. S. 274, 277, 278, 284 (1876).
11 Wall. 259, 78 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 80 (1871).
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clear that bte is liable to be sued and this carries with it the.
right to use all the means and appliances of defense". In the
case of MoVeigh v. United States, the defendant was a resident.
of Richmond, Virginia, within the confederate lines and a rebel
and he loses by default in the District court. In the Ownbey
case, the defendant was a non-resident of Delaware and his elementary right of appearing and defending his property is utterly destroyed by the imposition of an impossible condition by theplaintiff, as dominus litus in the litigation. The Supreme Court
of the United States denounces the first and condones the second.
Roller v. Holly4s involved the validity of a Texas statuteunder which a defendant residing in Virginia was required to
appear and answer a suit in Texas in five days, exclusive of the
day of service and return. The defendant showed that it would
take four days to get to Texas, leaving only one day, Sunday,
for the preparation of his case. The court said,4 9 "It is mani-fest that the requirement of notice would be of no value what-ever unless such notice were reasonable and adequate for the
purpose.... Without undertaking to determine what is a reason-able notice to non-residents, we are of opinion, under the circumstances of this case, and considering the distance between.
the place of service and the place of return, that five days wasnot a reasonable notice, or due process of law."
This was an action for the foreclosure of a vendor's lien
and was regarded as a suit in rem. The significance of thecase for our purposes is that the only object of serving processwas to enable the defendant to come in and defend. If the statute in that case, instead of providing that the defendant ivould
have to appear and defend in five days, had required him as acondition to appearing and defending to have paid into court
the amount of the lien sought to be foreclosed, the situationwould have been nowise different from that upon which the
adjudication rested. In the one ease the notice was unreasonable.
and inadequate for the purpose of giving the defendant a reasonable opportunity to defend; in the other case he was prevented
from appearing and defending by an unreasonable condition.
In both cases the process bade the defendant to come and defendi
m176

U. S. 398 (1899).
"At p. 409.
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and in each of them he was prevented from defending by physi-eal difficulties interposed by the statute.
Hoveyj v. E/1iot 50 is a great constitutional landmark. There
-the court of original jurisdiction, after the service of process
and the joinder of issue, struck the defendant's answer from the
files, as a punishment for his contempt in refusing to obey the
court's orders. Justice White speaking for the court said, "The
fundamental conception of a court of justice is condemnation
-only after hearing. To say that courts have inherent power to
deny all right to defend an action and to render decrees without
any hearing whatever, is in the very nature of things to convert
the court exercising such authority into an instrument of wrong
-and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute of justice
upon which the exercise of judicial power depends. Can it be
-doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in
-one's defense ? If the legislative department of the government
-were to enact a statute conferring the right to condemn the
-citizen without any opportunity whatever of being heard, would
it be pretended that such an enactment would not be violative
of the Constitution? If this be true, as it undoubtedly is, how
-can it be said that the judicial department, hag yet the authority
to render lawful that which if done under express legislative
sanction, would be violative of the Constitution?
If our analysis of the Ownbey case is correct, the Delaware
statute, if properly construed would have been valid and in
.accord with due process of law, but the Delaware courts placed
such a strained construction on the statute that it positively
:deprived Owhbey of notice and hearing and compelled him to
,submit to a default judgment. The Ownbey case is even more
indefensible than the Hovey case, for Ownbey had not committed
contempt of court. On the contrary, he was imply insisting on
the elementary right to appear and present his defenses of non
assumpsit, payment, and the statute of limitations, leaving the
lien upon the attached property undisturbed, dependent on the
outcome of the suit. Could the plaintiff in fairness demand
more? Unless a special doctrine of due process is to be created
for this kind of case, it would seem that this Delaware procedural contrivance is not in accord with the doctrine relied
on in the cases above. And in reaching this conclusion it is not
'5167

U. S. 409, 417, 435 (1897).
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necessary to speculate as to whether the defendant really had a
valid defense on the merits. To one ivho protests against the
taking of his property without due process of law, it is no answer
to say that in his particular case due process of law would have
led to the same result because he had no adequate defense on
the merits. The Supreme Court of the United States has said, 51
"'Whether in fact, the individual has a defense to the debt, or is
without defense is not important. To assume that he has none
and therefore that he is entitled to no day in court, is to assume
against him the very point he may wish to contest."

'Reese v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 123 (1873).

